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28 Days Later: The Russia Sanctions Law Washington Switched Off

Writer: Elizabeth Travis
Elizabeth Travis
10 minutes ago
7 min read

Grand neoclassical building with giant U.S. flags hanging from arches against a bright sky.

On 18 September 2026, President Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act into law. Congress had written escalation into statute: tariffs on the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas, and new restrictions on Russia's state banks, energy sector and access to financial messaging. Twenty-eight days later, two days before those measures were due to bite, the President waived almost all of them. A week before that, his Treasury had licensed the trade in Russian diesel.


In April, OpusDatum's analysis of the Iran war, "Sanctioning Themselves", described a sanctions regime fracturing under fire, as Washington improvised licences to calm oil markets. Yet October is different. The improvisation has become a method: Congress legislates, the executive suspends and the Treasury licenses around its own designations. For UK firms the lesson is blunt. A US sanctions law can no longer be read as a forecast of US enforcement, and a US licence buys a UK person nothing at all.


A law disarmed in four weeks


The Act was not symbolic. Public Law 119-111 provided for a 500 per cent increase in duties on Russian goods. Goods from the five largest importers of Russian crude, and the five largest of Russian gas, faced 100 per cent increases if those countries made new purchases. It also reached state-affiliated Russian banks, investment in the energy sector, sovereign debt and financial messaging services. On S&P Global Commodities at Sea data, India and China, taking 1.8 million and 1.2 million barrels a day of Russian seaborne crude, were the obvious targets.


Executive Order 14436, signed on 16 October, suspended nearly all of it. The waivers run "until such time as the President or the Secretary of State" determine that "further action is appropriate". There is no end date. The President's own explanation was spare: "My decision on Russia is a very simple one," he wrote on 18 October (S&P Global).


The administration's case deserves a fair hearing. It tied the waiver to peace talks on Ukraine, according to S&P Global. It also pointed to a diesel arrangement announced on 9 October: Russia, the President said, would supply more than 300,000 tonnes immediately and more thereafter (Oil & Gas Journal). The pressure was real: Kpler data cited by Oil & Gas Journal showed Gulf crude flows down to about 8.5 million barrels a day, from over 20 million a week earlier. But the relief is thin, and its motive is not hard to read. Vijay Vaitheeswaran of the Council on Foreign Relations called the announcement "really for political effect at home, to try to influence voters in this election".


The sharpest critics are in Washington


The most damning verdicts have not come from Kyiv or Brussels. Richard Blumenthal, a lead Democratic sponsor of the Act, said the waivers "have nothing to do with our national security and everything to do with sucking up to Vladimir Putin" (S&P Global). Ted Cruz, a Republican, said: "I think it was a mistake." On 13 October, twelve senators from both parties on the Foreign Relations Committee urged the President to reverse the diesel deal. Two days later, twenty-two House members asked the administration to reconcile it with existing law (Council on Foreign Relations).


Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations put it most sharply: the deal showed Washington "was willing to start dismantling sanctions unilaterally, even when doing so violated its own laws". His colleague Matthias Matthijs concluded that Russia policy is "now driven by high prices at the pump before the November 3 midterm elections, rather than by any shared transatlantic strategy". Bills from Gregory Meeks and from a bipartisan group led by Brian Fitzpatrick would undo the diesel waiver (Roll Call). Neither has yet come to a vote.


The licence reaches Washington's own targets


General License 135 is the sharper instrument. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) signed it on 9 October. It authorises "all transactions" prohibited by two sets of US Russia regulations that relate to the sale, delivery, offloading or importation of Russian-origin diesel, until 7 April 2027. Its only carve-out concerns accounts of the Central Bank of Russia, the National Wealth Fund and the Ministry of Finance. It contains no exclusion for blocked persons.


That silence matters. The US designated Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia's two largest oil companies, on 22 October 2025. Less than a year later, a licence whose text excludes no blocked person authorises US persons, on its face, to deal in Russian diesel whoever refined it. Clyde & Co warns that the licence "sits in tension with the Russian Oil Act and may therefore be subject to legal challenge". The Kremlin has confirmed that the first tanker under the deal left the Baltic port of Primorsk on 22 October, due in the US around 7 November (The Moscow Times).


Washington polices the pipes it reopens


The contradiction runs deeper than diesel. On 1 October, under Operation Economic Outcast, the US Treasury designated the Russian A7 network a significant transnational criminal organisation. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) found that A7's third-country "Sub-Agents" had processed more than $17 billion between January 2025 and June 2026. Treasury framed the action through Iran: the network had served the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Central Bank of Iran.


In the first half of October, then, Washington declared Russian evasion infrastructure criminal and switched off the statute built to punish Russia's oil customers. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that those who facilitate illicit finance for America's adversaries "will lose access" to the US financial system. Yet the same administration has licensed a trade that earns Moscow hard currency. Punishing the plumbing while licensing the revenue is not a strategy. It is a negotiating posture.


London has not blinked


The UK moved the other way, and moved first. It sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil, "the two largest Russian oil majors" in the UK Government's words, on 15 October 2025, a week before the US. Its 8 October 2026 package added 38 designations, including the producers Zarubezhneft and INK Capital, and took UK coverage above 90 per cent of Russia's oil production capacity. Shadow fleet designations passed 600 tankers, and two of the five financial targets had processed or facilitated transactions for A7.


The price cap tells the same story. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) cut the UK cap, in step with the EU, to $44.10 a barrel from February 2026; the US kept $60, according to Washington Trade & Tariff Letter. Urals averaged $90.7 in September, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. UK maritime services for Russian crude sold above the cap remain prohibited.


A US licence buys a UK firm nothing


This is where a policy failure becomes a compliance risk. The UK's maritime services ban applies, in the UK Government's guidance, "to all UK persons, wherever they are in the world". Its price cap exception "is not applicable to services for the benefit of designated persons". A UK bank, insurer, broker or trader that finances or covers diesel from Rosneft or Lukoil therefore risks making funds or economic resources available to a designated person, however clearly Washington has licensed the cargo.


OFSI needs little to act. It fined Deutsche Bank AG London Branch £165,000 on 30 April 2026 over two payments in mid-2022, totalling £635,618.75, to a company wholly owned by a designated person. According to OFSI's penalty notice, the lists supplied by the bank's screening vendor "did not include data in relation to Okko's ownership". A foreign licence will be no better a defence than a vendor's blind spot.


The switch can be flipped back


Yet the waiver is not repeal. The Act remains law, and the order tasks the US Trade Representative (USTR) with monitoring Russian oil and gas purchases and recommending further action. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration would take up to 60 days to assess the economic effects (Oil & Gas Journal). If the duties return, they apply to importers that "knowingly" make new purchases, and the Act defines "knowingly" to include what a person "should have known".


OpusDatum's August analysis of US delisting practice, "Sanctioned Until Convenient", found that American listings increasingly move with the diplomatic relationship rather than the conduct. October extends that finding from names to statutes. In practice, UK firms must plan for movement in both directions. First, they should treat General License 135 as a US authorisation for US persons. They should then map every point where a diesel transaction touches UK jurisdiction: UK nationals and UK entities wherever they operate, London booking, sterling settlement, UK insurers and brokers. Second, screening must reach the refiner, not just the seller, because UK designations of Rosneft, Lukoil and Zarubezhneft apply at any price.


Third, price cap attestations remain a live UK obligation. Fourth, the licence has no wind-down provision, so a cargo financed under it can be stranded if it is revoked; the Graham Act duties, if restored, arrive with a "should have known" standard attached. Finally, a sanctions policy that promises compliance with 'all applicable sanctions' must say which regime prevails when two of them disagree. Most do not.


Conclusion: An opening offer, not a deterrent


Sanctions work when their targets believe they will last. Congress passed a law designed to make Russia's customers believe exactly that. Twenty-eight days later the President showed them otherwise; in between, his Treasury licensed the trade. The UK has held its line, and UK firms are bound by it whatever Washington decides next. A sanctions law that can be switched off in twenty-eight days is not a deterrent. It is an opening offer.


Does your sanctions policy say which regime prevails when Washington and London disagree?


If it does not, we can help you close that gap before a cargo, a payment or a regulator exposes it, so contact us.


At OpusDatum, we help firms assess where UK, US and EU sanctions obligations diverge across their business, and whether their governance would hold if a licence were withdrawn without notice. Our focus is the defensibility of those decisions before OFSI, OFAC or a correspondent bank asks to see them.


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